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Daniels,: Commercialization of Human Tissues: Has Biotechnology Created the

COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN TISSUES: HAS
BIOTECHNOLOGY CREATED THE NEED FOR AN
EXPANDED SCOPE OF INFORMED CONSENT?
INTRODUCTION

"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body...,1
Overruling the lower court decision in Moore v. Regents of University of
California, the California Court of Appeal, Second District, reaffirmed Justice
Cardozo's 1914 pronouncement in Schloendorff.2 In Moore, the court found that
the plaintiff, John Moore, had a property interest in his body and bodily tissues
equal to a right of control.3 This right gave Moore a cause of action against his
doctor and the University of California for conversion 4 of his tissues, which
Moore alleged were appropriated and developed into valuable commercial
products without his consent.5
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal decision that
Moore had a cause of action for conversion, but held that he did state a cause
of action for lack of informed consent.6 While acknowledging that most suits
alleging lack of informed consent arise when physicians fail to fully disclose the
risks of a medical procedure, 7 the court stated that in addition to risks, a
physician must also disclose "personal interests unrelated to the patient's health,
whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional
judgment." Failure to disclose these interests "may give rise to a cause of
action for performing medical procedures without informed consent."9 This

1.
2.

Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129,105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
Moore v. Regents of University of California, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230,1247,249 Cal. Rptr.

494, 505 (1988) C'Moore T", aff'd in par; rev'd in par 51 Cal. 3d 120, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990)
C'Moore IMD.
Moore 1, 202 Cal. App. at 1248, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
3.
4.
Conversion is any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in
denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein. Culp v. Signal Van & Storage, 142 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 859,862,298 P.2d 162,164 (1956); Igauyev. Howard, 114 Cal. App. 2d 122, 126,249 P.2d 558,

561 (1952).
5.
Moore I, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1254, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
Moore 11, 51 Cal. 3d at 148, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164. The California Supreme Court
6.
characterizes the cause of action "either as the breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose facts material
to the patient's consent or, alternatively, as the performance of medical procedures without first
having obtained the patient's informed consent." Id. at 129, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150. The court noted
that in the present context, the term "fiduciary" was "overly broad" and only signified "that a physician
must disclose all facts material to a patient's decision." Id. at 131 n.10, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152 n.10.
For clarity and conciseness, this paper will refer to the cause of action as "lack of informed consent."
7.
Id. at 129, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
8.

Id.

9.

Id.
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holding is the focus of this Comment.
Prior to the advent of biotechnology, the prospect of significant financial gain
from scientific research on human tissues or cells was unheard of. Now,
however, "the biotechnology revolution has moved us literally or figuratively,
from the classroom to the board room and from the New EnglandJournalto the
Wall Street Journal."" The potential for commercialization and profit from
research on human bodily products raises novel issues." This Conunent
addresses one of these issues, informed consent, and suggests that new advances
in biotechnology have created a need to expand the right of informed consent
to protect the right of self-determination.
This Comment first briefly examines the influence of biotechnology on human
tissue research. Next, in analyzing the case of Moore v. Regents of University of
California, this Comment identifies new issues that biotechnology and commercialization bring to the law of informed consent. Section III provides a brief
overview of the history of informed consent in medical and research settings,
focusing on access to, and use of, human tissues for research. Finally, concluding
that present consent laws do not meet the presumed purpose and need which
they are intended to fulfill with regard to research on human tissues, this
Comment proposes legislation which would expand existing consent requirements
in order to correct the present deficiency.
L BIOTECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN TISSUE RESEARCH

Biotechnology has had a tremendous impact on scientific research and in
particular, on research using human cells and tissues. Biotechnology is broadly
defined to include "any technique that uses living organisms to make or modify
products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific
uses."'2 This Section describes new procedures in biotechnology and explains
how these new procedures affect longstanding scientific values and the doctorpatient relationship.

10.

Rosenberg, Using Patient Materialsfor Product Development: A Dean's Perspective, 33

CLINICAL RESEARCH 452, 453 (1985).
One question raised is whether the person whose tissue is utilized in the profit-producing
11.
research has the right to share in the market value realized from his tissue. That issue is beyond the
scope of this paper, but the answer will depend on answers to the problems discussed in this

Comment. One San Diego biotechnology firm which uses blood from healthy research subjects

discloses to these subjects how they will use the blood and offers each donor between fifty and one

hundred dollars per unit for their service. Who Owns Human Cells?, San Diego Tribune, Dec. 18,
1989, at AA-2, col. 3.
OFFICE OF TEcHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
12.
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT, OTA-BA-337 at 24 (Mar. 1987)
[hereinafter OTA REPORT].
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A New Proceduresin Biotechnology
The majority of research being done on human cells and tissues utilizes three
technologies: 3 (1) tissue and cell culture technology; (2) hybridoma technology;14 and (3) recombinant DNA technology,9 commonly referred to as
genetic engineering. These new scientific techniques can transform human
biological material into valuable commercial products.16
For example, in the Moore case, the defendant, Dr. Golde, used biotechnology
procedures in his research on Moore's cells.' 7 Through the methods of tissue
and cell culture technology and genetic engineering, Golde cultivated and
transformed a sample of Moore's diseased spleen into a human cell line.' The
cell line developed from Moore's tissues ultimately produced products 9 that
defendants estimated would be valued at three billion dollars by 1990?
B. Effect on TraditionalScientific Values
Biotechnology has not only introduced new techniques and procedures into the
realm of scientific research, it has also altered the traditional incentives,
practices, and relationships characteristic of the scientific research community.
Two events in 1980 were primary catalysts of this process. First, the Patent and
Trademark Amendment Act of 19802 gave universities and other nonprofit

Id. at 4.
13.
Id. at 31. Hybridomas are hybrid cells, created by the fusion of two types of cells, one
14.
from a particular kind of immortal tumor cell line called a myeloma and an antibody producing B
lymphocyte. Hybridoma cultures can be made to grow continuously and produce monoclonal
antibodies. These important commercial products are proteins which aid the body's immune
mechanism. Id. at 44. See Royston, Cell Lines From Patients: Who Owns Them? A CaseRepor 33
CLINICAL RESEARCH 442 (1985) (describing a case involving proprietary rights to a hybridomal cell

line).
DNA is the material of which genes are composed. Genes are responsible for the
15.
inheritance of characteristics in successive generations. OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 44.
Recombinant DNA refers to the formation of new combinations of DNA molecules in the laboratory
by genetic engineering. Pinon, RecombinantDNA: Controvery and Promise A Scientist's Overview,
in FROM RESEARCH TO REvoLTnON 3 (R. Bohrer ed. 1987). Already several commercial medical
products have been developed by recombinant DNA techniques. OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 45.
Human biological materials are human body parts, replenishable and nonreplenlshable,
16.
whether healthy or diseased. Replenishable parts include hair, blood, bone marrow, milk, urine,
saliva, team, perspiration, semen, and skin. Nonreplenishable parts are body organs like the brain,
kidney, and bone. OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 24.
Moore 1, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1236, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
17.
Id A cell line, which has the capability of continuous and indefinite growth, may be used
18.
to study biological processes, to test new drugs, to test the toxdcity of various chemicals, and to
produce products which may be of value. OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 35. Some cells and tissues
are difficult to culture and establish into a cell line. Most successful cultures are derived from
malignant tissue, but not all tumors can develop into continuous cultures. Id. at 33.
These products, called lymphokimes, help control the immune system and may have
19.
potential therapeutic value for certain cancers and viral diseases. Id. at 40.
Moore 1, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1239, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
20.
35 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
21.
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institutions patent rights to inventions arising out of federally funded research.
Second, in 1980, the United States Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty
held that a live, human-made "micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable
subject matter."22 Following the Chakrabarty decision and the passage of the
Patent and Trademark Act, a huge amount of capital was invested in technology
utilizing human tissues.? A survey conducted by the U.S. House of Representatives Science and Technology Committee revealed that fifty percent of the
eighty-one medical institutions responding to the survey used patient tissues and
fluids in their research.2 4 In addition, the survey reported 211 patent applications were filed between 1980 and 1985,2 a 300 percent increase over the
previous five year period.Y
The potential of tissue commercialization and the expanded scope of
patentable material, which now includes cell lines and their products, 7 have
changed the practice of intellectual sharing in the academic research setting.
The traditional rewards for research have been professional recognition,
academic stature, the acquisition of research grants,28 the advancement of
knowledge, and the betterment of mankind. These rewards have become
inadequate as the prospect of commercialization and profit from the labors of
research has become a distinct possibility.? After Chakrabarty,and the passage
of the Patent and Trademark Amendment Act, the sharing and disseminating of
new knowledge with fellow researchers at other universities gave way to a trend
of protective non-disclosure of research until rights were secured by filing for a
patent. Without a patent filing, researchers who published their new findings
lost the exclusive use of their scientific discoveries.3
The biotechnology industry has eagerly added patent protection to its arsenal
of protective devices. 3' Instead of promoting immediate sharing of new
inventions, patent law encourages researchers to delay publication of new

22. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
23. Hardiman, Toward the Right ofCommerciality: RecognizingPropenyRights in the Commercial Value ofHuman 7issue, 34 U.C.LA L Rev. 207,211 (1986).
24. Stone, Cells ForSale, DISCOVER 33, 39 (Aug. 1988).
25. Id.
Sherman, The Selling of Body Parts,NAT'L LJ. 1, 33 (Dec. 7, 1987).
26.
27.
Hardiman, supra note 23, at 211.
28. I at 210.
Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 453. Rosenberg believes that growing public awareness of
29.
the physician/researcher's conflict of interest and attempts to commercialize his research will result
in an increase in litigation as the individual wishes to share in the profit derived from his tissues.
Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights and the Norms ofScience in BiotechnologyResearch, 97 YALE
30.
LJ. 177, 184 (1987).
Id. at 230. Industry had long utilized trade secrecy as well as actual secrecy to protect new
31.
inventions. A trade secret is a protective device by which reasonable efforts are taken to preserve the
secrecy of information that derives independent economic value from not being generally known.
Unlike patent protection, trade secrets afford only limited rights; others may independently discover
and use the same invention. Israelson, CurrentIssues in ProprietaryRights to Biotechnology, in FROM
REsEARcH TO REVOLUTION 61 (R. Bohrer ed. 1987).
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discoveries until they have secured and protected their inventions by filing for
a patent. Once the patent is issued, the knowledge enters the public domain,
but the inventor retains the exclusive right to make, use, and sell the invention
in the U.S. for seventeen years. 32 Considering that over 2,000 biotechnology
patents have been filed since Chakrabartyheld that living organisms were not
precluded from patent protection, 33 intellectual property law now shapes the
sharing, dissemination, and advancement of scientific knowledge.
C. Effect on the Doctor-PatientRelationship
The biotechnology revolution has not only altered the incentives and practices
of the medical research community, but it has also impacted the doctor-patient
relationship. 34 When physicians are also researchers whose work on patient
tissues ties them to industry through consulting positions, stock options, and
research grants,35 the profit motive may take priority and conflict with the
physician's fiduciary duty to his patient. 6 The physician/researcher's fiduciary
duty has been eloquently defined by Hans Jonas, who has written extensively on
human subject experimentation:
In the course of treatment, the physician is obligated to the patient
and to no one else. He is not the agent of society, nor of the
interests of medical science, nor of the patient's family, nor of his cosufferers, or future sufferers from the same disease. By the simple
rule of bilateral contract (analogous, for example, to the relation of
lawyer to client and its "conflict of interest" rule), the physician is
bound not to let any other interest interfere with that of the patient
in being cured.... 37
The conflict of interest encountered by the physician/researcher when
presented with the opportunity to commercialize a patient's tissues may greatly
strain his fiduciary duty to his patient/research subject. 3 The danger increases

32.
Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 185; 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 154, 271 (1988).
33.
Israelson, supra note 31, at 60. These filings include patent applications for genetic
engineering, hybridoma techniques and gene splicing. One may patent a process or method, a product
such as a new drug or chemical, or an apparatus. After Chakrabarty,one may also patent living
organisms or genetic material so long as they are not naturally occurring or have been altered by man.

Id.
34.

OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 97.

35.
Hardimansupra note 23, at 212. More than half of all molecular biologists and immunologists in the National Academy of Science have consulting or equity relationships with the business
sector. Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 453.
36.
Caplan, Blood, Swea4 Tears, andProf. The Ethics of the Sale and Use of PatientDerived
Materialsin Biomedicine, 33 C11NICAL RESEARCH 448, 450 (1985).

37.
SchneyerMedicalDisclosurePractices,
Wsc. L. REV. 124,160 n.153 (1976) (quoting Jonas,
PhilosophicalReflections on Epernentingwith Human Subject in EXPIMENTATION wrrH HUMAN
SuBnlEs 21 (P. Freund ed. 1970)).
OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 97.
38.
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that a physician may relax his unyielding duty to put the patient's interest above
all else because of his dual loyalty as a researcher seeking knowledge, recognition, and/or profit 39 For example, the physician could be tempted to perform
tests or remove body tissues or fluids in situations where previously he would
have hesitated.
Adequate informed consent, however, could safeguard the patient against this
potential conflict of interest. 4° If the physician must disclose and obtain
consent for planned research involving potential profit, then unnecessary testing
and tissue removal would be forestalled. Although current federal regulations
provide some protection to research subjects,4 no statute clearly requires a
physician to reveal to a patient the possible commercial value and intended use
of his body parts.42 This lack of a clear statutory duty to inform patients of
potential commercialization is precisely what triggered the dispute in the Moore
case.

II. THE MooRE CASE
In 1984, John Moore initiated a lawsuit, naming as defendants Dr. David
Golde, Shirley Quan, the Regents at the University of California at Los Angeles,
Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corporation, and Genetics Institute Corporation."
Diagnosed as having hairy cell leukemia in 1976,4 Moore sought confirmation
of the diagnosis and medical treatment from Dr. David Golde at the University
of California at Los Angeles. 5 In October of 1976, as part of the treatment,
Golde removed Moore's spleen." Moore alleged that prior to surgery, Golde,
Shirley Quan, and other defendants arranged to receive a piece of the spleen for
their research without informing Moore or obtaining his consent.47 Ultimately,
they used Moore's spleen cells to establish cell lines and products which they
proceeded to patent as the Mo cell-line.4 The defendants also entered into

39.
Id.
40.
Hardiman, supra note 23, at 235.
41.
OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 110. The Food and Drug Administration requirements for
informed consent are set forth in 21 C.F.R. § 50 (1990). The Department of Health and Human
Services basic policy for protection of human research subjects are listed in 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1990).
42.
Stone, supra note 24, at 33.
43.
Moore 1, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1236, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
44.
Stone, supra note 24, at 33. Hairy cell leukemia is a rare form of cancer which results in
the proliferation of B lymphocytes (white blood cells that produce antibodies). Id.
45.
Moore , 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1235, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
46.
Stone, supra note 24, at 34. Removal was not a cure, but a way to normalize patient's
blood count, since the spleen of a hairy cell leukemia patient can destroy healthy blood cells. Id.
47.
Moore 1, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1237, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
48.
Stone, supranote 24, at 34. Rather than the B lymphocytes produced in excessive amounts
by most hairy cell leukemic patients, Moore produced large quantities of T lymphocytes (cells that
fight viruses and affect the immune system). The cell line also produced large amounts of proteins
called lymphokines which may be able to aid the immune function in certain cancer and AIDS
patients. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol27/iss1/12

6

Daniels,: Commercialization of Human Tissues: Has Biotechnology Created the
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN TISSUES

1990]

contracts with commercial firms who wished to develop and market the Mo cellline.4 9
Before his initial surgery in 1976, Moore signed a surgical consent form
authorizing the hospital to dispose of any severed tissue or member by
cremation. 50 However, he never consented to research or commercialization of
his spleen or tissues.51 Nonetheless, Golde managed to obtain Moore's tissues
for almost seven years without his consent. Between November 1976 and
September 1983, Moore traveled from Washington state to UCLA approximately
every six months at Golde's request for testing of his blood and other bodily
products. 2 Moore became suspicious when, upon telling Golde that he could
not afford the trips and preferred to have his blood tested in Washington, Golde
offered to and paid for two of these trips.53 On his second to the last visit to
UCLA on April 11, 1983, Moore, for the first time, was asked to sign a consent
form acknowledging that information from the research on his blood or bone
marrow might not benefit him directly.5 4 The form also stated that he
voluntarily granted "to the University of California any and all rights I, or my
heirs, may have in any cell line or any other potential product which might be
developed from the blood and/or bone marrow obtained from me."55 Although
Moore signed the form, he alleged that he did not know the defendant's true
research and
commercial interests, and that if he had known, he would not have
56
consented.
On September 20, 1983, the defendants asked Moore to sign another form,
identical to the one he signed on April 11, 1983. This time, Moore consented
to the removal of his blood, but refused to grant the defendants any rights to his
cell-line.,57 Defendants, nonetheless, continued to exploit the cell-line. 58
Moore decided to investigate after Golde informed him that he had missigned
the April consent form, requested that he re-sign it, and mailed him another
form with a letter urging him to grant the university all rights to any cell line or

49. Moore 1, 202 CaL App. 3d at 1239, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500. Genetics Institute Inc. and
Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation entered into agreements with Golde for rights to the cell line
and its products. On March 20, 1984, Golde and Quan received a patent to the cell line and its
products which they assigned to the Regents of the University of California. Id. at 1240, 249 Cal.
Rptr. at 500.
50.

Stone, supra note 24, at 35.

51.

Id. Not only was he not informed of any potential commercial use of his tissues, Moore

also alleged that Golde denied such use when Moore later asked him whether there was any potential

financial or commercial value of his tissues. In fact, Golde discouraged such questioning. Moore II,
51 Cal. 3d at 132, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
52.

Moore 1, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1238, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500. Besides blood, doctors also

removed skin, bone marrow, and sperm. Stone, supra note 24, at 35.
53.

Stone, supra note 24, at 35.

54.

Id. See Moore 1, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1289, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 531.

55.

Moore 1, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1289, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 531.

56.

Id. at 1239, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 501.

57.

Id.

58.

Id. at 1240, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
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product that might be developed.59 Moore's lawyers reviewed scientific articles
by Golde and read about a Mo cell-line from a Seattle patient with hairy6 cell
leukemia.60 They also learned that a patent was pending on this cell line. '
On September 11, 1984, Moore initiated his lawsuit. His complaint alleged
thirteen causes of action, including conversion, lack of informed consent, and
breach of fiduciary duty.62 The defendants demurred to all the causes of action.
Acting upon Moore's third amended complaint, the trial court sustained the
demurrer to the first cause of action, conversion, and held that the other causes
of action were defective because they incorporated the first one.6 Moore
appealed.l On July 21, 1988, the California Court of Appeal, Second District,
reversed the lower court decision and held that Moore had stated a cause of
action for conversionf. The court concluded that Moore had a property
interest in his bodily tissues,6 and that Moore's consent to surgery was not
consent to commercial exploitation and research of his tissues that was not
directly related to his treatment.6 The appellate court also held that any useS
of his removed tissue for purposes other than treatment required his consent.6
The California Supreme Court reversed that part of the appellate court's
decision finding a cause of action for conversion, but held that Moore had stated
a cause of action for lack of informed consent.69 The court relied on three

59. Stone, supra note 24, at 35.
60. Id.
61.
Id.
62. Moore , 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1236, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
63. Id. at 1241,249 Cal. Rptr. at 502. Other alleged causes of action include fraud and deceit,
unjust enrichment, quasi-contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, interference with prospective
advantageous economic relationship, slander of title, accounting, and declaratory relief. Id.
64.
Id. at 1242, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
65.
Id at 1242, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
66. Id. at 1244, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504. A recent Comment uses the California Court of
Appeal's Moore decision to argue that a property right in one's own bodily tissues is a prerequisite
to the maintenance of autonomy and control over one's person. Comment, The Autonomy of the
Human Body, 61 U. op CoLo. L. REV. 659,661 (1990). The California Supreme Court, however, held
that such a property interest is not essential. Present laws of informed consent, as modified and
expanded by the California Supreme Court inMoore,can sufficiently protect an individual's autonomy
over his body. Moore II, 51 Cal. 3d at 144, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164. To protect individual autonomy
over his body from possible adverse effects of commercialization, the Comment suggests alterations
in present federal requirements governing informed consent in the research setting. Unfortunately,
such regulations only apply to federally sponsored research. Comment, supra, at 674. Patients like
Moore, who derive some therapeutic benefit from the tissue removal and whose physicians do not
receive federal funds for their research, would remain unprotected.
67. Id. at 1254, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
68. Id. at 1255, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
69. Moore II, 51 Cal. 3d at 147, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164. The court explained that a conversion
cause of action requires the plaintiff to prove interference with his ownership or right of possession.
Moore did not have possession of his removed tissues; nor did he establish any ownership interest in

them. In addition, California statutes severely limit a patient's interest in excised cells. In refusing
to recognize a cause of action for conversion, the California Supreme Court expressed concern that
allowing conversion liability for the commercialization of human cells would adversely affect medical
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principles in reaching its conclusion. First, a competent adult has the right to
decide whether or not to undergo medical treatment based on his "right in the
exercise of control over his own body."70 Second, a patient's consent must be

informed.7 ' Third, the physician has a duty to reveal "all information material
to the patient's decision."72
Considering these principles, the court concluded that physicians must disclose
their research or economic interests which might influence their professional
judgment.7 The Moore court reasoned that such personal interests which might
influence the performance of medical procedures unrelated to the patient's
health create a potential conflict of interest and materially affect the patient's
decision. 74 The court held that failure to disclose such interests may give rise
to liability for "performing medical procedures without informed consent... .75
Moore is a case of first impression and may be but a harbinger of the litigation
that will ensue once the public becomes aware of the commercial value of their
bodily tissues. 76 In general, patients trust their doctors and do not want to feel
taken advantage of and exploited. 77 Specifically, they do not want to be treated
as "containers of useful and commercially attractive biological materials" to be
mined without their permission. 78 For example, Moore stated that, if he had
been informed at the outset of the potential use of his tissues, he would have
understood and would have felt that he had "made a contribution to medical science."79 Instead, he felt dehumanized and exploited. Moore's negative feelings
could have been avoided with proper informed consent.
Ill. INFORMED CONSENT

The doctrine of informed consent 8° manifests the high value our society

research. The court felt that its decision adequately protected a patient's right to make autonomous
informed medical decisions by requiring physicians to disclose any research or economic interests in

the patient's tissues as part of the informed consent process; therefore, a conversion cause of action
was not needed. Id. at 144, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.

70.

Id. at 129, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.

71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.

74.
75.

Id. at 133, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
Id. at 129, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.

76.

Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 453. Class action lawsuits by those whose specimens were

pooled for use in research is another distinct threat to biotechnical companies, researchers, and
universities. Sherman, supra note 26, at 33.

77.

Caplan, supra note 36, at 450.

78.

Id.

79.

Stone, supra note 24, at 37. Moore describes feeling "shocked," "taken advantage of," and

"humiliated" to be thought of as "Mo-a cell-line, like a piece of meat." Id. at 35.
80.
Informed consent is a set of legal rules which physicians must abide by in their interactions

with patients. It is also an ethical doctrine and a process which affords patients the right to
participate in medical decisions affecting their health and well being. P. APPELBAUM, C. LiDz & A.
MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT 3 (1987).
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places on individual autonomy. Informed consent requires the physician, absent
an emergency, to make a reasonable disclosure of the risks of any proposed
treatment or surgery. The patient, in turn, can decide intelligently whether or
not to submit to the suggested procedure. 1 This Section examines the historical
development of informed consent for medical treatment as well as medical
research. It then considers the government's failure to establish regulations
governing informed consent of tissue commercialization and describes the
dangers that arise from this deficiency.
A HistoricalDevelopment: Informed Consent to Treatment
Patient consent to medical treatment dates back to the late eighteenth century
case of Slater v. Baker and Stapleton,s where two surgeons were held liable for
operating on a patient without his permission. However, the doctrine of informed consent is of more recent origin. The term was first used in a 1957
California case, Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees.53 In
Salgo, the court instructed the jury that a physician has a duty to inform his
patient of "all the facts which mutually affect his rights and interests and of the
surgical risk, hazard, and danger, if any... ." 4 The Salgo court went on to state
that the doctor may not withhold "any facts which are necessary to form.., an
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment."a Nor may the
physician minimize known risks in order to obtain consent.8
Although courts universally agree that a physician has a duty to the patient to
disclose and inform, courts are split as to the proper standard to appliy in
determining whether a physician has fulfilled his duty. Under the traditional
standard, 57 ("the professional standard"), the court uses the custom of disclosure
by competent physicians in the medical community as the criteria against which
the defendant's disclosure is measured8s A slight majority of jurisdictions
favors this "professional," "objective," or "community" standard.9 This standard
is more favorable to the medical profession because the patient must rely on

81.
Schwartz, A MalpracticeAntidote, 9 TRIAL 32, 33 (1973).
82. P. APPELBAUM, C. LiDz & A.-MElSm, supra note 80, at 36 (discussing Slater v. Baker and
Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (KB. 1767)). The two physicians in Slater disunited a partially healed
fracture. The need for the patient's cooperation when anesthesia was not used was probably an
important factor in the evolution of informed consent. Id.
83.
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317
P.2d 170, 181 (1957).
84. 1d.
85.
Id.
86. Id.
87. Landsverk, Informed Consent As A Theory of Medical Liability, WIs. L Rav. 879, 894

(1970).
88.
89.

D. WARREN, PROBLEMS IN HosPrrAL LAw 125,126 (1978).
OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 98.
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expert testimony to establish the standard of disclosurer and physicians are
often unwilling to testify against other physicians.
The modem and growing trend9' is for courts to base the standard for
informed consent on the needs of a reasonable patient 92 rather than on the
standards of the medical community. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit first used this "reasonable person test" in
Canterbury v. Spence.93 The Canterbury court held that the patient's right of
self-decision requires that he be given "enough information to enable an
intelligent choice."94 The duty to disclose is based on what a reasonable person
in the patient's position would want to know in order to make an informed
decision. 95
Regardless of the standard used, in a treatment situation, physicians must
usually reveal the following:
1. the nature and purpose of the diagnostic, medical or surgical procedure;
2. probable risks and benefits;
3. reasonable alternative procedures and their probable risks and benefits; and
4. probable risks if one foregoes all interventions. 96
Both standards excuse the physician's duty to disclose in the following situations:
when an emergency exists, when the patient is legally or mentally incompetent,
or when disclosure might be harmful to the patient's well being.97
B. Informed Consent to Research
Although "[i]t is clearly against the law to experiment on a patient without
obtaining his informed consent,"98 there are no clear guidelines concerning
disclosure of the researcher's intent to commercialize his research results. While
the rules of informed consent to treatment are governed by case law, consent to
research is governed mainly by codes, regulations, and statutes.99 The first
attempt to formally codify consent to research occurred at the end of World War
IL Outraged and shocked by the Nazi tortures performed under the guise of
medical experimentation, the American military tribunal presiding at the
Nuremberg trials in 1946 asked its expert witnesses to formulate ethical

90. D. WARREN, supra note 88, at 126. This rule was modified in many states to measure a
physician's disclosure against that of competent physicians in the same or similar communities. Such
a change facilitates the ability of plaintiffs' to obtain a medical expert willing to testify against a fellow
physician. It also recognizes that physicians must be nationally certified and that there are national

standards for the practice of medicine. Id. at 126, 127.
91.
92.

OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 98.
Id.

93.
94.

Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Id. at 786.

95.

OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 98.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. (summarizing F. RozoVSKy, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACICAL GUIDE (1984)).
OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 99.
G. ANNAS, ACLU GUIDE TO PATIENT RIGHTs 103 (1975).
P. APPELBAUM, C. LiDz & A. MEEI, supra note 80, at 211.
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standards for human research.1 ° These standards, known as the Nuremberg
Code, were recited in the judgment against the Nazi physicians in United States
v. Karl Brandt.1"' Besides limiting the power of researchers to inflict physical
harm, two of the ten sections of the Nuremberg Code discussed informed consenti12 Although the Code was intended to apply only to the Nuremberg
trials, 1 3 it prompted other countries to create their own codes for ethical
research."°4
The Declaration of Helsinki, adopted by the World Health Organization in
1964, attempted to express common international concerns and principles about
ethical standards for clinical research.1 5 Whereas the Nuremberg Code
required informed consent in all cases, the Declaration of Helsinki was more
lenient. For example, under the declaration, nontherapeutic research, which
would not directly benefit the individual, could not be performed unless the
subject freely consented after being fully informed of the nature, purpose, and
risk of the research. 1 6 However, informed consent for research in conjunction
with patient care was recommended, but was only required when "consistent with
patient psychology."' °7
While the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki were nonbinding,
successive U.S. regulations which followed had more weight, albeit some loopholes. 10 Following congressional hearings to study procedures for regulating
the testing of new medications, Congress passed the Drug Amendments of
1962.1 9 The amendments required researchers to disclose the investigative
purpose of experimental medications to research subjects.110 Researchers also
had to obtain consent unless they felt that "in their professional judgment,
disclosure and consent would be contrary to the best interest" of the individual.111 Professional judgment, however, afforded researchers much discretion.
Four years later, additional regulations were enacted for research funded by
the National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), and later by the U.S. Department of

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 214.
Id.
Id.

107. Id. Although the Helsinki standards were intended to safeguard individuals in research
settings, standards for those research subjects also receiving medical care fell below the common law
standard for consent to treatment, due to such ambiguous phrases as "if at all possible" and "consistent with patient psychology." Id. at 215.
108. Id. at 216.
109. Id. This law tightened the regulatory procedures of the Food and Drug Administration

governing the testing of new medications, food additives, biological products, and medical devices.
OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 94.

110. P. APpELB
111.

i,C. LtDz & A. MEIsnL, supra note 80, at 216.

Id.
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Health and Human Services ("DHHS"). The regulations required a prospective
review of research methodology by a committee from the institution doing the
research.lu Each committee, known as the Institutional Review Board
("IRB"), 13 was to determine whether appropriate methods to obtain informed
114
consent from research subjects were included in the research protocol.
Between 1966 and 1981, governmental agencies made several revisions in their
regulations. These changes resulted in a uniform standard for medical research
funded by NIH and for clinical trials of new medicines conducted under Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") regulations by researchers seeking FDA
approval."1
On the issue of informed consent, the requirements of NIH and FDA
regulations are virtually identical. Both require the researcher to disclose:
1. the research involved, its purposes, expected duration, procedures, and any
experimental procedures;
2.
reasonably foreseeable risks or discomfort to the subject;
3.
reasonably expected benefits to the subject or to others;
4. appropriate alternative procedures or treatment;
5. the extent to which confidentiality will be maintained;
6. where risk is more than minimal, 116 what compensation or medical
treatment is available;
7. the name of an individual to contact for answers about the research and
the subject's rights; and
8.
the voluntary
nature of participation, and the absence of penalty for
7
refusal.1
There are some situations where the mandated disclosures and informed
consent are not required. Under the FDA regulations, an unapproved
experimental medicine or medical device may be used without obtaining
informed consent only when: (1) a life threatening situation necessitates the use
of the experimental item; (2) the researcher cannot obtain consent because of
an inability to communicate with the subject; (3) time is not sufficient to obtain
consent from the subject's legal representative; and (4) there is no approved
alternative therapy that provides an equal or greater chance of saving the
subject's life. The researcher and a physician not involved in the research must

112.

Id. at 217. OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 94.

113. P. APPELBAUm, C. Lioz & A- MFSEL, supra note 80, at 218.
114. Id. at 217.
115. Id. The FDA regulations govern clinical trials that support applications for research or
marketing permits for FDA regulated products. These products include food and color additives,
medical devices for human use, biological products for human use, and electronic products as well
as new medications. 21 CF.R. § 50.1(a) (1990).
116. 45 C.F.RL § 46.116(a)(6) (1990); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(6). Minimal risk means that the
risks of anticipated harm "are not greater considering probability and magnitude, than those ordinarily
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations
or tests." 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(g); 21 C.F.R. § 50.3(1).
117. 45 C.F.R § 46.116(a)(1-8); 21 C.F.RL § 50.25(a)(1-8).
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attest that all of the above requirements are met. 18 Exempt from the NIH
regulations for informed consent is research that involves collecting existing data,
or pathological or diagnostic specimens and records, if these sources are publicly
available or if the information is recorded in such a way that subjects cannot be
identified." 9 In addition, the IRB may waive or alter informed consent
requirements if it finds that: (1) the research involves only minimal risk; (2) the
waiver or alteration will not adversely affect subjects; and (3) the research could
not practicably be performed without waiver.1 °
C. Consentfor Human Tissue Commercialization

There are two methods for legally acquiring access to human tissue from living
persons for.research purposes.2i Physicians may remove tissue for diagnostic
or therapeutic purposes as part of medical treatment, or they may remove tissues
for express research purposes. m Both methods require that informed consent
be obtained for the physical risks involved in tissue removal? 3
Prior to Moore, in a treatment situation, physicians were not expressly required
to disclose potential uses of excised tissues,2 4 or potential commercial value
of removed body parts? 5 In a research setting, however, the nature of the
research as well as the associated risks, must be revealed with two exceptions.m
"Research using publicly available pathological or diagnostic specimens is exempt
from the DHI-S informed consent policy, as is research recorded in such a way
that subjects cannot be identified".'z In addition, when the research involves
only minimal risk, the consent requirement may be altered or waived? 8 In all
other instances, the nature of the research must be revealed, but there is no
express requirement to disclose intent to commercialize. DHHS does require the
researcher to inform the subject of "significant new findings developed during the
course of the research which may relate to the subject's willingness to continue

118.

21 C.F.R. § 50.23(a).

119.

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(5).

120.
121.

45 C.F.RIL § 46.116(d)(1-3).
Wagner,Human lssue Research: WhoOwnstheResuls?, 14J. Coi. & UNiv. L 260,270

(1987). There are also two statutory methods of post mortem tissue access. The Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) provides for donation of body parts upon death of the donor to
advance medical science and state statutes provide access to tissues from unclaimed dead bodies. Id.
122.

Id.

123.

Id.

124.

Sherman, supra note 26, at 33. Of course, informed consent for the research would be

required in addition to consent to removal if access to the tissue for research purposes poses a greater
risk due to the need for more extensive removal for research than for purely medical therapeutic or
diagnostic purposes. Wagner, The Legal Impact of PatientMaterials Used for ProductDevelopment
in the Biomedical Industry, 33 CuNIcAL RESEARCH 444, 446 (1985).

125.
126.

Sherman, supra note 26, at 33.
OTA REPORT, supranote 12, at 106; 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(5).

127.
128.

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(5).
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d)(1-3). See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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participation. " 9
Physician/researchers and patient/subjects might differ as to whether the
prospect of commercialization of the patient/subject's tissues is a "significant new
finding" within the meaning of the NIH regulations.' ° In the Moore case, the
defendants could have argued that removal of Moore's tissues over a period of
years was merely necessary for treatment and that the marketability of his tissues
was purely incidental. Thus, the resulting commercialization was not a
significant new finding. In response, Moore could have argued that the
marketability of his tissues was a significant new finding and therefore should
have been disclosed. Since Moore did assert that disclosure of the commercial
value of his cells would have affected his willingness to have his tissues removed
and used,'3 ' this argument would have been reasonable.
D. Risks Mere Informed Consent is Not Obtained
Scientific research and medical training and education, which in theory benefit
mankind, may actually pose a risk to those individuals and patients who are the
subjects of the research or educational process. Moreover, a physician/researcher's pursuit of personal financial gain may pose yet another risk.
This latter risk is magnified by the potential of highly profitable commercialization of products derived from patient material which biotechnology has made
possible.
The law of informed consent evolved to protect the rights of individuals in
their bodies, not to prevent researchers from profiting from research involving
human cells." 2 However, biotechnology has unleashed a market potential in
certain human tissues, thereby creating a conflict of interest that puts the human
sources of these tissues at risk when they are not aware of the possibility of
commercialization.1 3 The more freedom a physician/researcher has with regard
to his research and duty to disclose, the less protection is available to his
subjects.' M This inverse relationship has proven to be particularly true when
the physician/researcher's goals become distinct from those of his patient/subject.1 35
Thomas Duffy discusses this negative aspect of conflict of interest as he
analyzes a clinical situation described in a book by Jay Katz, The Silent World of

129.

Id. § 46.116(b)(5).

130.

OTA REPoRT, supra note 12, at 102. A significant new finding arguably is one which might

affect a person's willingness to continue to participate as a research subject. Id.

131.

Moore , 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1238, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500.

132.

OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 107.

133.

Id. at 97; see also Hardiman, supra note 23, at 235.

134. P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, supra note 80, at 238; Eser, The Researcher as
"Offender" and "Vtctim'-Comparative Observadons as to Freedom and Responsibiizy of Science and

Technolog,, B.Y.U. L.REV.571, 583 (1987).
135.

Duffy, Agamemnon's Fate and the Medical Profession, 9 W. NEW ENG. L Ray. 21, 22

(1987).
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Doctor and Patient."6 A young woman patient, Iphigenia Jones, nearly lost her
breast because her physician had failed to disclose alternatives to mastectomy for
breast cancer.137 Only by a chance conversation did she discover and select an
alternative breast-sparing procedure. The name Iphigenia was selected by the
author as an allusion to the daughter of Agamemnon, the Greek mythological
hero who nearly sacrificed his daughter to appease the gods so that he and his
beached fleet might set sail for Troy.m Like the breast cancer patient, only
through an accidental intervention was Iphigenia saved. When Agamemnon's
paternal responsibilities conflicted with his desire to maintain his "reputation as
a leader and his avaricious need to conquer Troy,"139 his fatherly tendencies
were eclipsed.
Physician/researchers are not immune to the "Agamemnon factor." Although
their goals may be far nobler than those of the Greek hero, the result is the
same-the patient's individual autonomy and right of self-determination are
sacrificed to promote the physician's personal interests. Medical journals are
replete with examples of patients being sacrificed to medical research and education. In one study, researchers studying immunity injected live cancer cells into
twenty-two debilitated patients without their informed consent. 14 The patients
were told they would be injected with "some cells" but the fact that these were
live cancerous cells was withheld.14' The researcher declared that he believed
the research posed no risk to his patients and, in fact, none suffered any ill
effects. 42 When asked why he did not use himself and his colleagues as
subjects, he responded, "I did not regard the experiment as dangerous. But let's
face it, there are relatively few skilled cancer researchers, and it seemed stupid
to take even the little risk.""'
Research goals often influence a physician's disclosure pattern. 44 While
misrepresentation probably is rare, frequently patients are not fully informed ofs
their role in a research project or significant risks may not be fully explained."
Numerous cases document situations where proven treatments or medications
were withheld in order to test a new method or drug. In one study, twenty-five
persons, from whom medications were withheld, contracted rheumatic fever.'"

136.

Id. at 21 (referring to J. KA'z, THE SILENr WORLD OF DocrOR AND PATIENT (1984)).

137.
138.

Duffy, supra note 135, at 21.
Id. at 22.

139.
140.

Id.
Mulford, Experimentationon Human Beings, 20 STAN. L REV. 99 (1976).

141. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. JOUR. OF MEDICINE 1354, 1358
(1966).
142. Mulford, supranote 140, at 99.
143. Id. (quoting Southam, Human Experimentation:CancerStudiesatSloan-KetueringSirPublic
Debate on MedicalEthics, in 143 SCIENCE 551, 551 (1964)).
144. Schneyer, supra note 37, at 160.
145. Beecher, supranote 141, at 1354.
146. Id. at 1356.
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In another study, twenty-three percent of patients died after being denied
medication to treat typhoid fever, compared to an eight percent death rate in
those treated with the proven medication. 147 These examples suggest that the
practice of nondisclosure may not be a rare occurrence. Furthermore, a survey
by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association revealed that only fifty-seven
percent of the responding physicians always obtained a patient's consent before
using experimental drugs.14
Medical education may also influence the physician's disclosure patterns. 49
For example, in a ward situation where student doctors practice newly learned
skills on indigent patients, these patients often are not forewarned that they will
be examined and questioned by a series of medical students, interns, and
residents merely to aid the learning process of the examiners. The more
"interesting" or rare the disease, the more the patient will be subjected to these
multiple inquiries without explanation of why they are being inconvenienced.150
In the past, medical and surgical tests, often with significant risk, were performed
for the primary purpose of teaching students the proper procedural methods. 51
The goal of medical training at times overshadowed concern for the patient's
right of self-determination.5'
Just as education and research can influence the physician's choice of
treatment, so can financial considerations. 15 3 Surgical decisions may hinge
partly on payment schedules determined by insurance companies.15
For
example, in the early 1970s, doctors in Europe had nearly given up radical
mastectomy as the preferred treatment for breast cancer and adopted less
mutilating procedures. In the United States, however, where Blue Shield paid
two to three times as much for the radical surgery than it paid for simpler
procedures, surgeons did not relinquish the more disfiguring technique until
women demanded alternatives after learning of less drastic options via reports
in popular magazines and on television.55 Apparently, monetary5 6valuing of
different surgical procedures may bias treatment recommendations.
Finally, biotechnology has created new financial incentives which put patients
at risk of being subjected to unnecessary procedures or to procedures with

147.

Id.

148.

Mulford, supra note 140, at 100.

149.

Landsverk, supra note 87, at 893.

150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id.

153.

At least one researcher believes that unnecessary surgical procedures are more likely to

be performed where there is an overabundance of surgeons relative to the needs of the community
and financial pressures are therefore quite strong. Schneyer, supra note 37, at 168.

154.

Schneyer, supra note 37, at 167.

155.

Id.

156.

Id. at 166.
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greater risk than warranted.5 7 Unless new laws are created, patients like
Moore will be forced to make decisions without being fully informed of all
extraneous interests that could affect their doctor'9 recommendation. Specifically, patients face the risk of losing their right of self-determination and control
over their own body and tissues.5s8
E. Assessing Damages
Evaluating the risk of losing self-determination and control poses a problem.
Risk is "commonly defined as a product of the probability of adverse consequences and the value of those adverse consequences." s9 But what is the value of
the risk of loss of self-determination where there may be no actual measurable
physical injury? Loss of informed self-determination can be analogized to loss
of other process rights.1' Process rights, such as the right of free speech and
the right to vote, have been evaluated by juries which, with the court's permission, have assigned damages for violation of these constitutional rights.'61 The
right to vote was considered so valuable that damages were allowed solely for
"the wrongful deprivation of it without evidence of actual loss of money,
1 62 The court declared that the jury
property, or any other valuable thing ....
could determine the amount of damages because "each member of the jury has
personal knowledge of the value of the right."1' Like other process rights, the
right of informed consent is worthy of protection.
Physicians have a duty to provide sufficient and material information to
patients to allow those patients to participate in decisions concerning their
body.' 64 Patients who are not fully informed about the use and possible
commercialization of their tissues are deprived of the right to consider all
material information before making decisions concerning their bodies and tissues.16 Biotechnology creates a major conflict of interest in the physician. He
or she may feel reluctant to fully inform if the patient might refuse access to
possibly valuable tissues upon full disclosure. Fearing such a refusal, the

157. Hardiman, supra note 23, at 235. The California Supreme Court stated that a physician
who has research interest, might order procedures "that offer marginal or no, benefits to the patient'
Moore II, 51 Cal. 3d at 130, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151. It also stated that a "reasonable patient would
want to know whether a physician had an economic interest that might affect the physicians

professional judgment:' Id. at 129, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
158. Id.
159.

Bohrer, The Future Regulation ofBiotechnolog, in FROM RESEARCt TO REVOLIJION 103

(R. Bohrer ed. 1987).
160. Twerski & Cohen, InformedDecisionMaking andThe Law ofTorts: The Myth ofJusticiable
Causation, 1988 U. ILL L Rsv. 607, 651 (1988).
161.

Id. at 649.

162.

Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919).

163.

Id.

164.
165.

Twerski & Cohen, supra note 160, at 651.
Id. at 649. Hardiman, supra note 23, at 235.
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physician may decide not to reveal that the tissues may have market potential.
Thus, patients are denied full information with which to decide what they wish
done with their body. Deprival of self-determination through inadequate
disclosure and informed consent must be avoided. New federal and state
regulations which provide clear standards are one way to facilitate this goal.
IV. PROPOSAL
Although federal regulations require researchers to reveal more information
in order to obtain valid consent in a research situation than in a medical
treatment setting, 16 disclosure of the commercial value of an individual's
tissues is not required in either situation. In the research setting, section
46.116(b)(5) of the Code of Federal Regulations requires disclosure if the
information is considered a "significant new finding" that might influence the
subject's continued participation in the research. 67 In the medical setting,
using the traditional professional staidard, a patient would have to be informed
only if such disclosure was the custom in the medical community.lss The
modem trend of the "reasonable person standard"169 would require disclosure
if the information was necessary to enable a reasonable person in the patient's
position to make an intelligent choice. Tissue donors in the research setting may
argue that the knowledge that their tissues may become the source of valuable
commercial products is a "significant new finding." In the medical setting, they
would allege that such knowledge is necessary for the formation of intelligent
decisions regarding their bodies.170 Such knowledge could alert the donors to
their physicians' possible conflicts of interest. Also, for moral, religious, or
ethical reasons, some individuals may prefer not to have their tissues developed
into marketable commodities. Other donors might consent to commercial use
of their tissues, contingent upon receiving a share in any profit derived from
such use.
A Protection of Medical Patients
The Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA) performed an intensive study
analyzing the economic, legal, and ethical rights of tissue donors as well as the
rights of physicians and researchers, and concluded that "the opportunity to

166. OTA REPoRT, supra note 12, at 100. This stricter standard for research subjects is logical
since, unlike patients, voluntary subjects altruistically submit themselves to research procedures which
do not directly benefit them.
167. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(5).
168. Warren, supra note 88, at 125. See also supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
170. OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 102. Those opposed to disclosing the possibility of
commercial gain argue that any gain is highly speculative at the time of tissue removal. They also
claim that subjects might be unduly influenced by the prospect of financial gain and consent to the
- research solely for that purpose. Id. Another concern is that subjects might withhold consent or
auction off their tissues to the highest bidder, thereby impeding medical research. Id.
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identify potentially marketable tissues and cells in research may set a new but
limited disclosure standard."17' Under the OTA standard, physicians must
disclose where it is reasonably foreseeable that the tissue would be marketable
or when information "material" to a subject's decision, rights, and welfare is
available.'7 Disclosure under the OTA proposed standard would permit the
patient to weigh the conflict-of-interest factor along with the other risks and
benefits to reach an autonomous and intelligent decision.lu The patient could
then consult with a physician who is detached from the tissue research or
commercialization to arrive at an intelligent and informed choice.
At the present time in the medical setting, many patients who require excision
of tissues for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes do not receive adequate
information to allow a truly informed consent. Today, many consent-totreatment forms vaguely describe what happens to human tissues once they are
removed.' 74 Standard form language may authorize the hospital "to examine and
dispose of, or retain for medical purposes, any tissues or parts which are
removed during the operation."17 Equally vague is California's largest health
maintenance organization's standard consent to operation form which authorizes
the hospital and medical group "to dispose of any severed tissue or member in
accordance with accustomed hospital practice."176 When the tissue has
potential market value, this consent clause is insufficient. This language does
not suggest that the hospital or physician who disposes of the tissue may reap
substantial profit from it. 77
Legislation or regulation should require that the medical purposes be expressly
spelled out, disclosing that such purposes may include research with possible
commercial value. Furthermore, disclosures in the written consent form must
be considered merely an "adjunct"178 to legislatively required oral disclosure if
the physician believes there is a likelihood of commercialization.
It is not usually anticipated that a particular individual's tissue will have
unique and important properties likely to result in successful commercial use.
79
Rarely does a specimen from a single source yield a marketable commodity.

171.

Id. at 105. The study was requested by the House Committee on Science and Technology

and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Id. at iii.
172. Id. at 105.
173. Id. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
174. Warren, supra note 88, at 141, 145.

175.

Id.

176. KAISER PERMANENM CONSENT TO OPERATION, form 12-2163 (Dec. 1985).
177. The issue of the right to consent to the commercial use of one's bodily pans is also
relevant when a request for autopsy is made to the deceased's next of kin. A widely used consent
form for this purpose authorizes removal of tissues or organs and allows the physician "to retain,
preserve and/or contribute the same for such diagnostic, therapeutic or other scientific purposes, as
he shall deem proper." KAISER PERMANENE NExT OF KIN AurHORizAToN FOR AuTopsY, form NS-

5735 (Feb. 1984). Again, these purposes are not elucidated.
178. P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, supra note 80, at 181.
179. Who Owns Human Cells?, San Diego Tribune, Dec. 18, 1989, at AA-2, col. 2.
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Often, new medical products and drugs result from the use of tissues from
thousands of donors.'8 In these cases, a simple explanation on the consent
form that one possible use of removed tissue is for scientific research would
suffice to inform tissue donors.
When the tissue is more unusual and prior to removal there is a stronger
likelihood that the research will lead to commercial gain, then the physician
must disclose this information and obtain consent. In a situation where the
physician discovers the commercial potential of a particular tissue after removal,
and subsequently removes more for the purpose of further research and
development, mandatory disclosure and consent must precede the additional
removal. Lack of disclosure and consent under those conditions gave rise to the
cause of action recognized in the Moore case. Additionally, when the physician/researcher initially has no indication of the value of the tissue, but later
learns of such commercial value, he must make an effort to notify the patient
and receive consent for further use even if no additional removal is needed.
Such regulations would have protected Moore, as well as Dr. Golde, his
physician.
B. Protection of Research Subjects
To attain similar results in the research setting, sections 46.116(a)(1-8)1"' of
the DHHS regulations covering informed consent should be amended to include
disclosure of the possibility of commercial gain.lu Section 46.116(d)(1-3),
which allows the IRB to waive informed consent under certain conditions of
minimal risk, should be eliminated. 'l
In addition, section 46.101(b)(5), 1
which exempts from federal regulations pathological or diagnostic specimens if
they are publicly available or the investigator records information so that donors
are unidentifiable, should be eliminated to further protect patients' rights.1a8
If identification of all donors becomes mandatory and the scope of informed
consent is expanded to encompass research and commercialization of human
tissue, some additional record keeping and administrative supervision would be
required. However, this additional administrative burden would be minimal
since written consent for tissue removal for medical or research purposes already
is required in most instances. The additional burden measured against the gain
of an individual's right of self-determination over his body is a small price to pay.

180.
181.
182.
183.

I
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116(a)(1-8).
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116(d)(1-3).
Id. § 46.101(b)(5).

184. Such a change would be "consistent with the general spirit of the guidelines to protect the
interests of the research subject." OTA REPORT, supra note 12, at 18.
185.

Salgo, 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181 (1957).
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CONCLUSION

The purpose of the doctrine of informed consent is to provide a patient with
all the information, including all the risks, that might affect "his rights and
interests" in making an intelligent decision about the proposed medical
treatment t 66 Ideally, researchers must inform their subjects of the nature and
purpose of the research as well as the risks involved. When the medical
procedure or research involves tissue removal, the physician/researcher must
disclose the risk of such removal.
Biotechnology has created a new risk that necessitates an expansion of the
traditional notion of informed consent disclosures. The seminal Moore case
illustrates this need for broader disclosure requirements. Unfortunately, Moore
is binding only in California, leaving patients living outside of California
unprotected by this valuable precedent. Other states have not yet addressed the
issues governing rights and obligations of those engaged in research and
commercialization of human tissues.
In order to correct present inadequacies in the informed consent process,
legislation and/or regulation need only slightly expand the required disclosures
under current informed consent doctrine to protect patients in the medical
setting. Modest alterations of DHHS regulations can achieve similar results for
research subjects. When physicians or investigators plan to use human tissue in
their research, they should be required to reveal this information as well as the
possibility that the tissue may be developed into a marketable product. Such
disclosure is essential to the preservation of the fiduciary nature of the
doctor/patient and researcher/research subject relationships, as well as to the
protection of the rights and interests of all parties.
Linda Daniels, MD."

186. The California Supreme Court held that a physician must "disclose personal interests
unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment"

when he seeks the patient's consent for a procedure. Moore 11, 51 Cal. 3d at 131, 132,271 Cal. Rptr.
at 152.
* Dedicated with love to Eric, Jill, Lori, and Mark. The author also wishes to thank
Professor Robert Bohrer for his helpful critique.
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